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Abstract 
Nigeria, as a commonwealth country operates an adversarial system of justice, a system that requires judges to remain 
unbiased umpires with minimum or no interference in the conduct of cases by the parties, especially in civil litigation. All the 
rules of civil procedure in Nigeria have always been premised on the strict adversarial philosophy but this had only 
succeeded in creating room for unnecessary delay and congestion in civil litigation in the country. A set of new civil 
procedure rules aimed at giving the judges firmer control over proceedings before them were therefore recently enacted. 
However, these rules, in a bid to promote speedy trial, seem to have ignored the issue of validity in respect of some of their 
provisions which appear to challenge the existing law of evidence in the country. Evidence is one of the maters under the 
Exclusive Legislative List of the country’s Constitution1 with the result that only the federal legislature can make law on the 
subject. On the other hand, all the new rules, with the exception of that of the Federal Capital Territory, were made by the 
states. Therefore, any provision in the rules which touches on evidence may constitute an encroachment on the federal 
legislative power and as such may not be valid. The object of this paper is to examine those provisions in the new rules which 
appear to deal with evidence and to evaluate the extent of the validity such provisions. 
Keywords: Nigerian law of evidence, new rules of civil procedure, validity. 
1. Introduction  
Nigeria, like most commonwealth countries that derive their legal systems from the English common law operate an 
adversarial system of justice. A concomitant of this is the strict confinement of the role of judges, especially in civil 
litigation, to that of unbiased umpires.2 Subject to the rules of procedure, judges are to interfere as little as possible in the way 
and manner parties conduct or adduce evidence in their cases.  In Onibudo v Akibu,3 the Supreme Court stated: 
The duty of a court is to decide between the parties on the basis of what has been demonstrated, tested, canvassed 
and argued in court. It is not the duty of a court to do cloistered justice by making an enquiry into the case outside 
court even if such enquiry is limited to examination of document which were in evidence … 
Both the English civil procedure rules4 as well as the various civil procedure rules in Nigeria5 have always been premised on 
the adversarial philosophy of non-involvement of the judges. However, the application of such rules has only produced grave 
and depressing consequences. 6  They have only served to encourage undue delay and excessive congestion in the 
administration of justice, especially in view of the pressure on the modern justice system. As graphically stated by Professor 
Osinbajo:7 
Another policy defect in the application of existing procedural rules is the excessive adherence of judges to the 
tenets of adversarial litigation. In a bid to hear both sides at every stage and to refrain from descending into the 
arena, judges routinely indulge counsel, many of whom exploit the system to delay or frustrate proceedings. 
                                                          
1
 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999. 
2
 See Okonji v. Njokanma (1999) 12 SCNJ 259 at 273 per Achike J.S.C. 
3
  (1982) 7 S.C. 60 
4
  See for instance The Supreme Court Practice (The White Book) 1999.  
5
   See The Lagos State (Civil Procedure Rules 1994; Federal Capital Territory High Court (Civil Procedure)  
      Rules, 2004; High Court Of Oyo State (Civil Procedure) Rules, 1998. (Uniform Rules). 
6
  See Yinka Fashakin, The New High Court Of Lagos State (Civil Procedure) Rules  2004- An Appraisal: The    
     Advocate Vol. 2 p 4. 
7
  See Prof. Yemi Osinbajo, in the foreword to Proposal for the Reform of the High Court of Lagos State (Civil  
     Procedure) Rules p.V. 
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In a survey conducted in Lagos State in 2001, it was shown that the average life span of a civil case from initiation to 
judgement at the High Court of the state was six years.1  Cases have been known to span far more years,2 with many cases 
abandoned without proceeding to judgement after several years in court.3 
There was clearly a need for change of approach and the Lagos State blazed the trail in this regard by enacting the Lagos 
State High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 20044, the objective of which, as stated in its Order 1 r. 1(2), is the “achievement 
of just, efficient and speedy dispensation of justice”. The Lagos example was followed in quick succession by the Federal 
Capital Territory, Abuja and various states of the federation.5 
The overall policy thrust of the new rules is to provide for “rules which curtail the excesses of counsel and give judges a 
firmer control of proceedings in their courts”.6 This follows the approach of the English Civil Procedure Rules 1998 which 
served as a major working tool for the Architects of these rules.  Explaining the philosophy behind Order 1 r.1 of the 1998 
English rules (which is in pari materia  with order 1 r.1(2) of the Lagos 2004 Rules now the preamble to 2012 Lagos Rules), 
Sir Richard Scott V- C (one of its drafters) said: 
Above all, civil litigations is now to be conducted in accordance with the overriding objective set out in CPR Part 1.  
The overriding objective requires the court ‘to deal with cases justly’. This is the antithesis of confining the court to 
referencing a contest. The court’s exercise of its powers must be directed to the decision that must be in due course be 
reached.  It should be a just decision.  Of course, justice must, under the CPR, be proportionate. The search is not 
necessarily for absolute justice. What is directed by the court to be done in preparation for the trial must be 
proportional to which is at stake in the case.  But the whole emphasis of CPR Part 1 is on the pro-active role of the 
court in with cases justly”7 (underlining supplied for emphasis). 
In a bid to give judges firmer control over the proceedings in their courts and to provide for a faster dispensation of justice, 
certain radical provisions have been made in the these rules which necessarily impact upon other aspects of Nigerian law, 
particularly the law of evidence which together with the rules of civil procedure constitute the main tools of civil litigation in 
the country. 
It appears necessary to examine some of the provisions of the rules vis a vis the existing law of evidence.  This is in view of 
the fact that evidence is a federal matter in respect of which only the Federal Legislature can enact laws being one of the 
matters listed in the exclusive legislative list of the constitution.8  No state has the competence to legislate on such matters 
and any provision in the rules which derogate from or is in conflict with any established rule of evidence must be null and 
void.9         
We shall therefore try to examine some of these provisions in the Rules with a view to assessing their validity against the 
background of the existing law of evidence. In doing this, we shall take the Lagos Rules as representative of the various 
Rules as similar provisions are contained the Rules with varying degree of modification.                                 
2. Depositions And Affidavits Made By Illiterate Persons 
According to Order 1 r. 2(2) of the 2012 Lagos Rules: 
(2) Where in this Rules depositions and affidavit are required to be made, if the deponent does not understand the 
English language such deposition or affidavit shall be made in a language he understands and shall be accompanied 
by interpretation thereof in English language. 
                                                          
1
  Ibid.  
2
  See for instance Ariori v Elemo (1983) 1 SCNLR 1. 
3
  Yemi Osinbajo op. cit. 
4
 Which has now been replaced with the 2012 Rules with some slight modification. 
5
 Federal Capital Territory High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2004; Kwara State High Court (Civil Procedure) 
Rules, 2005, Ogun State High Court (Civil Procedure Rules), Anambra State High Court (Civil Procedure) 
Rules, 2006, Enugu State High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2006, Kaduna State High Court (Civil Procedure) 
Rules, 2007 and Jigawa State High Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2008 etc. 
6
  Ibid  
7
 See Sir Richard Scott V- C (as he then was) in the KPMG Lectures, May 15th 2000. (Quoted in Bullen and 
Leak and Jacob, Precedent of Pleadings, 15th Edition: London, Sweet and Maxwell, 2004. p. 1 
8
  See Section 4 (2) and (3) and Item 23 on the Exclusive Legislative List of the Constitution of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria (1999) (hereafter referred to as “the 1999 Constitution”). 
9
  See Section 45, 1999 Constitution. See also A–G Abia State & Ors v A-G Federation (2002) 3 SC 106 at 186. 
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Affidavit has been defined by Black’s Law Dictionary as a “voluntary declaration of facts written down and sworn to by the 
declarant before an officer authorised to administer oath such as a notary public”.1 It has also been defined as a statement of 
fact which the maker or deponent swears to be true to the best of his knowledge, information or belief.2 According to 
Nwadialo,3 when it is used in proceedings, the affidavit is taken as evidence of the facts deposed to. Also, deposition has 
been defined by the same Black’s Law Dictionary4 as “the written record of a witness out of court testimony.” It seems to be 
settled that affidavits and depositions are matters of evidence and therefore come within the exclusive competence of the 
Federal Legislature.  In line with this, the Evidence Act, 2011, has made ample provisions regarding affidavit and how it is to 
be made.  Of particular interest for our present purpose are sections 117(4) and 119 which provide as follows: 
117(4)  An affidavit when sworn shall be signed by the deponent or if he cannot write or is bling, 
marked by him personally with his mark in the presence of the person before whom it is taken. 
119 (1) Where the deponent is illiterate of blind the affidavit shall state the fact and shall be accompanied 
with a jurat. 
      (2)  The jurat shall -  
(d)  where the deponent is illiterate or blind, it shall state such fact and shall state that the 
affidavit was read over to such illiterate or blind deponent or translated into his own 
language (in the case of a deponent not having sufficient knowledge of English), and 
that he appeared to understand it. 
      (3)  Where the deponent makes a mark instead of signing, the jurat shall state that fact, and that the 
mark was made in the presence of the person before whom it is taken. 
It is apparent from the above provisions that an affidavit deposed to by a person who does not understand English language 
must still be in English language.  All that is required is that the jurat must show that the affidavit had been read and 
interpreted to the deponent who must have appeared to understand same before signing or marking the affidavit in the 
presence of the person before whom the affidavit is taken i.e. commissioner for oath or notary public. 
The rational for this is not farfetched.  This is because the language of the courts to which the Evidence Act applies (and the 
Lagos State High Court is definitely one of them) is the English language. When any evidence or document in a language 
other than English is required in court, it must be interpreted into English language and it is only the English version that the 
court must take cognisance of. The Supreme Court per Iguh J S C stated in Ojengbede v Esan5 that: 
There can be no doubt that the official language of superior court of record in Nigeria is English and that if 
documents written in any language other than English are to be tendered and properly used in evidence, they must 
be duly translated into English either by a competent witness called by the party to the proceedings who needs them 
to prove his case or by the official interpreter of the court.  A judge cannot on his own engage in the translation or 
interpretation of a document written in a language other than English since he is preceded from performing the role 
of a witness and an arbiter at the same time in the same proceeding. See Damina v The State (1995) 8 NWLR 
(Pt.415) 513 at 539-540. It is not in dispute that the learned trial judge before whom Exhibit J was tendered is 
Yoruba and must have made use of his private and personal knowledge of the language to translate the said Exhibit 
J. This exercise, however, he was not entitled in law to engage in. I am therefore in total agreement with the court 
below that as Exhibit J was not written in the language of the court and there being no translation of it into English 
in the course of the proceedings, the learned trial judge was in definite error to have taken any notice of it in his 
judgement. 
It had earlier been held in Akereja v Oloba6 that a document in a language other than English cannot be exhibited to an 
affidavit and that only a copy translated into English and duly certified as such can be exhibited to an affidavit. 
The making and contents7 of affidavit and depositions are matters of evidence which fall within the exclusive legislative 
competence of the Federal Government.  No State can validly legislate on the subject.  Any State Law, including rules of 
                                                          
1
  Black’s Law Dictionary, 18th Edition: London, Thompson, 2004. 
2
  See Jossien Holdings Ltd v Lonamead (1995) 1 SCNJ 133  p. 141  
3
   F. Nwadialo, Modern Nigerian Law of Evidence 2nd Edition: Lagos, ULP  1999 p. 533 
4
  Supra at p. 472.  
5
  (2001) 12 S.C. (pt. II) 1 at 16      
6
   [1986]2 NWLR (pt.22) 257. 
7
  As opposed to the purpose for which and how it may be used in the court. See Order 33 rr.1, 
        4 & 6, 2012 Lagos Rules. 
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court, on the subject must be ultra-vires.  Therefore, the provision of Order 1 r. 2(2) of the 2012 Lagos Rules relating to how 
affidavit and depositions are to be made and what language they must contain is ultra vires. 
Even, assuming that the rule in question has been made by the State as a matter of practice and procedure within the purview 
of S 274 of the 1999 Constitution (which makes it a concurrent matter), it is still null and void for being inconsistent with the 
express provision of the Evidence Act quoted above, which is a federal legislation validly made on the same subject.1 
Assuming further that the rule is not inconsistent with the Evidence Act, it must still be caught by the doctrine of covering the 
field and must thereafter remain inoperative and unenforceable in view of the provision of the Evidence Act on the same 
subject.  As explained by Eso J.S.C. in A-G Ogun State v A-G Federation2: 
                     Where a matter legislated upon is in the concurrent list and the Federal Government had enacted a 
legislation in respect thereof, where legislation enacted by the state is inconsistent with the legislation of the 
Federal Government, it is indeed void and of no effect for inconsistency.  Where, however, the legislation 
enacted by the state is the same as the one enacted by the Federal Government, where the two legislations 
are in pari materia, I respectfully take the view that the state legislation is inoperative for the period the 
Federal legislation is in force.  I will not say void.  If, for any reason the Federal legislation is repealed, it is 
my humble view that the state legislation, which is in abeyance is revived and becomes operative until there 
is another Federal legislation that covers the field. 
In A-G Abia State and Ors v. A-G Federation,3 Uwais C.J.N. adopted the above statement of the law and said further: 
I agree that where the doctrine of covering the field applied, it is not necessary that there should be 
inconsistency between the Act of the National Assembly and the Laws passed by a House of Assembly. The 
fact that the National Assembly has enacted a law on the subject is enough for such law to prevail over the 
law passed by a State House of Assembly but where there is inconsistency, the State Law is void to the 
extent of the inconsistency. 
We humbly submit that, as the law stands, no court in Nigeria can insist that an affidavit by a person who does not 
understand English be made in a language other than English.  As long as the necessary jurat indicating that the content of the 
affidavit has been interpreted to the deponent and the other provisions of the Evidence Act regarding the making of an 
affidavit have been complied with, the courts are bound to accept such affidavit and cannot ask for any other version of the 
affidavit on the ground that the deponent does not understand English. 
3. Examination Of Witnesses At The Trial 
One of the most radical provisions made by the new Rules for the purpose of reducing the time spent on trial of cases is 
contained in Order 32 r.1 (1) & (4), 2012 Lagos Rules which provide as follows: 
(1) Subject to these rules and to any enactment relating to evidence any fact required to be proved at the 
trial of any action shall be proved by written deposition and oral examination of witnesses in open court. 
(4) The oral examination of a witness during his evidence in chief shall be limited to confirming his written 
deposition and tendering in evidence all disputed document or other exhibits referred to in the deposition. 
Apparently, the purpose of these rules is to substantially replace examination in chief of a witness by his written deposition 
which must have been filed in court and served on the other party thereby reducing the time that would ordinarily have been 
spent on normal examination in chief. 
Deposition has been defined by Black Law Dictionary4 as “the written record of a witness’s out of court testimony”.  It is a 
way of taking and recording oral evidence of a witness on oath to be used later in court proceeding.  
A written deposition clearly qualifies as evidence and its contents must satisfy all the requirements of the Evidence Act 
relating to oral and affidavit evidence.5 For instance, it must not contain hearsay or irrelevant evidence and a witness cannot 
give his opinion as evidence in the deposition. Being a matter of evidence, a State cannot legislate as to what a deposition 
should contain.  That is a matter for the Federal Legislature. 
                                                          
1
  See footnote 12 above. 
2
   (1982) 13 NSCC 1 at 35 
3
  Supra at 151 
 
4
  Supra at p.472 
5
 See Aregbesola v Oyinlola [2011] 9 NWLR (Pt 1253) 458 at 562 – 565; Buhari v. I.N.E.C. [2008] 19 NWLR (Pt.1120) 246 
at 511 
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On the other hand, we humbly submit that the way or manner by which the written deposition is brought into court and made 
part of the evidence before the court is a matter of procedure which, as we have submitted elsewhere above, is within the 
legislative competence of the state. The provision of the Rules that the written deposition shall become the evidence in chief 
of the witness by adopting or confirming it is a matter of procedure.1 
There is no provision in the Evidence Act, 2011 regarding the general power of the Courts to take oral evidence of a witness 
through written deposition. Section 107 of the Act which permits the proving of facts at the trial by affidavit is limited to 
specific facts and subject to special order of the Court granted for that purpose. 
However, there is also no provision in the Act that all oral evidence must be in open court.  All that is required by section 180 
of the Act is that subject to certain exceptions, “all oral evidence given in any proceedings must be given upon oath or 
affirmation administered in accordance with the provisions of the Oath Act or Law as the case may be.”  Whether the 
evidence on oath must be given entirely orally in open court or whether it may be given through written deposition (partly or 
fully), is a point on which there is no provision in the Act or any general federal legislation. 
Since there is no federal legislation on the point, we humbly submit that the provision of the 2012 Lagos Rules regarding the 
taking of part of oral evidence of a witness through written deposition is validly made and remains in force.  It is a matter of 
procedure within the legislative competence of a State and there is no federal legislation on the point so that the doctrine of 
covering the field cannot arise. 
4. Production Of Agreed Documents From The Bar 
Another provision in the 2012 Lagos Rules which is aimed at expediting trial proceedings is the provision of Order 32 r. 1(2) 
which provides that “all agreed documents or other exhibits shall be tendered from the Bar or by the party where he is not 
represented by a Legal Practitioner.” 
The purpose of this rule, apparently, is to avoid wasting of time in the process of tendering of documents that are already 
agreed by the parties by calling witnesses and leading them in evidence for the purpose of tendering the documents through 
them. 
The Evidence Act2 makes ample provisions for how contents of documents may be proved in evidence, how to prove due 
execution, presumptions of relating to documents and how to secure the production of documents in court.  However, the Act 
is completely silent on how the documents are to be tendered in the course of trial.  The general practice is to tender 
documents through witnesses except where a document is an official gazette or certified copy of a public document which 
may be tendered from the Bar.3 
It is our humble submission that, though a document or contents of a document is clearly evidence, how the document is 
tendered or placed before the judge is a matter of procedure in respect of which the State can legislate under section 274 of 
the 1999 Constitution.  Since there is no federal enactment on this point, the provision of Order 32 r. 1(2) is valid and 
effective. 
However, a note of caution must be sounded.  The fact that a document is agreed by the parties does not make the document 
automatically admissible.  The court must still determine the admissibility of all documentary evidence.4 This is important 
because there are certain documents which are absolutely not admissible and the fact that a party has not objected or has 
consented to their admissibility cannot render them admissible.  Where such a documents is admitted for whatever reason and 
acted upon by the trial court, it will be expunged on appeal and if its admissibility has occasioned a miscarriage of justice the 
judgement of the trial court may be set aside.5 
The whole purpose of speedy trial will be defeated where documents are hastily admitted simply because they are agreed 
only for such documents to be expunged on appeal and the judgement set aside. This is clearly possible where a party has not 
been represented by counsel at the trial or even, where he claims mistake of counsel who appeared for him at the trial. 
                                                          
1
 See Ballantyne v Ayi & Ors (2011) LPELR-4543(CA) 
 
2
  See Part V of the Act. 
3
  See Ogbunyiya v Obi Okudo (1979) 6 – 9 SC 32 at 43 in relation to tendering of official gazette from  the   
        Bar and Agagu v Dawodu [1990] 7 NWLR (Pt 160) 671, Okiki v Jagun [2000] 5 NWLR (Pt 655) 19;  
        Anatogu v Iweka [1995] 9 NWLR (Pt 415) 547 in respect of tendering of certified copies from the Bar. 
4
  See Olukade v Alade (1976) 2 S.C. 183 at 187-188 per Idigbe J.S.C.; Umar v. Bayero University, Kano (1988) 
7 S.C. (pt.II) 1  
5
  For further details, see F. Nwadilo op.cit pp 543-562; Olukade v Alade (1976) 2SC 183; Alashe v Olori Ilu 
(1964) 1 All NLR 390; Minister of Lands W/N v Azikwe (1969) 1 All NLR 490. 
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5. Power Of Court To Limit Evidence 
Some provisions have been made in the 2012 Lagos Rules for the purpose of giving the judges firmer control over the 
conduct of cases and the time spent on trial proceedings by giving them some power over control of evidence at the trial.  
Some of these provisions have always been contained in the 1994 Rules but it is believed that they are likely to be more 
effective within the general context of the new Rules. In fact, some of them have been modified in line with the new Rules to 
make them more effective and far reaching in their application.  Some of the provisions are considered hereafter, albeit 
briefly. 
According to Order 32 r.2, 2012 Rules, a judge may order or direct that evidence of any particular fact be given at the trial in 
such manner as may be specified by the order or direction. It may be by statement on oath or by the production of certain 
documents.  This empowers the court to determine, based on the facts of each case, the most effective and fastest manner by 
which a particular fact may be proved and to order that evidence of the fact be given in that manner.  However, it is 
submitted, that the court in making such an order must always take into account all the circumstances and justice of the case.  
For instance, the court must always take into account the difficulty and cost that may be involved in complying with such an 
order or direction. 
Order 32 r.3 provides that a judge may order that the number of expert witnesses that may be called at the trial be limited as 
specified by the order.  Also Order 32 r. 4 provides that unless a judge, for special reason, otherwise orders, no document 
shall be receivable in evidence at the trial of an action unless it has been filed along with the pleadings of the parties and 
Order 30 r.10 provides that a party who desires to call any witness whose deposition on oath has not been filed along with his 
pleading must apply for leave to call such a witness and the application must be accompanied by the deposition on oath of 
such witness. 
While Order 32 r. 3 of the 2012 Rules is almost an identical reproduction of Order 34 r. 4 of the 1994 Rules, Order 30 r.10 of 
the 2004 Rules quoted above understandably has no counterpart in the 1994 Rules.  It is a concomitant of the requirement of 
front loading.  As for Order 32 r.4 referred to above, it is an improvement on the Order 34 r. 5 of the 1994 Rules which only 
applied to “plans, photographs or model”.  The provision now applies to all documentary evidence. 
Another provision is Order 30 r. 11 which provides that a party must close his case when he has concluded his evidence.  
This may be done orally by either party and where the Judge considers that either party has failed to conclude his case within 
a reasonable time, he may close the case of that party suo motu.  This is a succinct reproduction of the windy provision of 
Order 33 r. 16 of the 1994 Rules. 
One of the major cause of delay in civil litigation is the lackadaisical attitude of litigants in calling their witnesses or 
tendering their documents, especially when they realise that they do not have a good case.  Instead of submitting to 
judgement or explore avenue for settlement of the case out of court, they continue to ask for endless adjournments of the case 
to enable them call this or that witness or to produce this or that document none of which may exist and even where they exist 
may not be material to the case.  The courts have always felt obliged to grant such adjournment so as not to be accused of 
denying any of the parties a right to fair hearing. 
With the above provisions, especially within the general context of the 2012 Rules, the courts now have enough weapon to 
discourage or even prevent litigants from undue waste of time at the trial.  If put to effective use, these provisions are capable 
of radically reducing the time required for trial of cases. 
However, a note of warning must be sounded that the courts must be flexible in their application of these provisions.  The 
application of the rules must be directed towards the attainment of speedy justice having regard to all the circumstances of the 
case.  For instance, the court should not hesitate to close the case of a party who obviously has no further material evidence to 
adduce and is keeping the case open because he realises that he has a bad case.  Neither should the court hesitate to refuse the 
introduction of a document which, or a witness whose, deposition has not formed part of the front loaded case of a party 
where it is clear that they are not material to the merit of the case. 
On the other hand, a court should readily permit the introduction of such evidence where the justice of the case demands.  For 
instance, where a party cannot readily lay his hand on a piece of evidence and he has to go to court to beat limitation period, 
the court should not hesitate to allow him introduce the evidence when it becomes available.  Also, where the failure of a 
party to proceed with his case is due to genuine difficulty as where a material witness suddenly becomes hospitalised, the 
court should not hesitate to grant necessary adjournment.  In such a case, closing the case of the party may amount to denial 
of fair hearing.1 
We must point out that the various provisions of 2012 Rules considered under this heading have nothing to do with the 
contents or the substance of evidence which, we humbly submit, is a matter of evidence within the exclusive legislative 
competence of the Federal Legislature.  Rather, they are concerned with the manner of or procedure for bringing evidence 
before the court, which, we submit, is a matter of practice and procedure within the legislative competence of the State vide 
                                                          
1
 Alsthom v Saraki [2005] 3 NWLR (Pt 911) 208 
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S.274 of the 1999 Constitution.  In so far as there is no federal enactment on the points covered by the provisions, the 
doctrine of covering the field as explained above cannot apply.  Those provisions are, therefore, valid and effective. 
6. Conclusion 
There is no gainsaying the fact that the new rules of civil procedure in Nigeria represent a commendable attempt by to shake 
off the lethargy of perennial congestion of the courts and undue delay in civil litigation in the country.  Some of the 
provisions of the rules, if put into effective use, are capable of drastically reducing the congestion in the courts and 
minimising the delay in conduct of cases before the courts.  
As we have tried to demonstrate above, there are certain provisions in the rules which directly or indirectly relate to issues of 
evidence.  Some of these can be regarded as mere matters of practice and procedure within the legislative competence of the 
States and are therefore valid and effective. On the other hand, there are some that touch on the substance of evidence and 
therefore falls within the exclusive legislative competence of the Federal Government.  They are ultra vires the State and are 
therefore, null and void. 
For instance, the provision of the Rules relating to the incorporation of written deposition as part of the evidence of a witness 
at the trial, tendering of agreed documents from the Bar as well as the power of the court to limit evidence, are matters of 
practice and procedure which are validly and effectively contained in the Rules.  
The same cannot be said of the provisions relating to the making of deposition or affidavit by a witness who does not 
understand English in a language which he understands to be accompanied by an interpreted version of such affidavit or 
deposition. 
The problem here is not unconnected with the wholesale importation of some of the provisions in the English Civil Procedure 
Rules which are not subject to the same Constitutional limitation which our federal structure necessarily entails. For instance, 
being a unitary system, there is no distinction between the power to make law for evidence and the power to make rules for 
procedure in England.1 In Nigeria, evidence is exclusively reserved for the federal legislature while the States may legislate 
on matters procedure.2  
We only hope that in the nearest future, the appellate Courts will have the opportunity to pronounce on the validity or 
effectiveness of some of these provisions in the new Rules. 
 
 
                                                          
1
  See for instance, The Supreme Court Rules, 1999 (The White Book) 
2
  See sections 4(2) & (3) and 274, 1999 Constitution. 
 
